Chuck Rosenberg Transcript: March 7, 2025
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:00:01):
Continuing this discussion about the Justice Department turning more toward the FBI in this discussion. And I’m still thinking about this given all the developments that have happened in recent weeks. But if someone had seriously suggested even after the November election that election deniers and conspiracy theorists would be heading the FBI at this moment, I think I would’ve taken that person immediately to the nearest emergency room for evaluation. But here we are and Chuck Rosenberg has graciously agreed to join us today. He’s uniquely situated to discuss this new era in federal law enforcement and the potential risks and challenges to the institutions as we know them. Chuck has served in key posts across the federal criminal justice system, chief of Staff to former FBI, director Jim Comey, US attorney in Alexandria and in Houston, two of the top US attorney postings in the nation and acting administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The list just goes on. His service crosses both Republican and democratic administrations when nonpartisan leadership was inherent to the work. Please welcome Chuck Rosenberg.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:01:41):
Thanks. Thanks Kevin. Thank you all for letting me start a few minutes early. I appreciate it. Kevin tells me it’s on the record, which is fine. It’ll also be far less interesting and entertaining, but that’s your call. I’m mostly here to answer questions. As Kevin mentioned, I’ve spent my life in federal law enforcement. I was appointed to one job by President Bush and another by President Obama. If you put a gun to my head, I couldn’t tell you if I was a Republican or a Democrat. I literally have no idea. Although I think actually this days I have a pretty good idea. It’s getting to be an easier question to answer.
(00:02:20):
I am deeply disturbed by what I am seeing. Like Kevin, I didn’t think I would ever see anything quite like this. One thing Kevin omitted, I started my career as a lion federal prosecutor, as an assistant US attorney. Probably the best job I ever had. And this may sound quaint or even naive, perhaps stupid, but I literally did not know the politics of anyone in my office. It was forbidden to talk about it. It just didn’t happen. And I tell people that and they think that can’t be. How could you be in a place for so many years and not know how the man or woman in the office next to you voted or how she thought? And it just never came up. We sort of prided ourselves on being apolitical and nonpartisan and whatever views you had outside the office, you never, ever, ever brought in the office.
(00:03:07):
And that also seems broken and perhaps irretrievably. So I don’t know. I don’t have a crystal ball, but that was sort of the ethos of the Department of Justice in which I grew up, like I said, appointed to one job by President Bush, another by president of Obama, fired in the first Trump term. A quick story on that, but I was at the time running the DEA, which is sort weird because as a line prosecutor, I had never done narcotics cases. I had done national security cases, white collar cases, normal mayhem stuff, but never narcotics. And so toward the end of the Obama administration was asked to run the DEA. My view is always when you’re asked to do something, if you can say yes, you say yes. I went over there, found it. Fascinating big management challenge for lots of reasons we don’t need to get into today, but always happy to talk about some other time.
(00:04:02):
But I loved the work in Mr. Trump’s first term. I think it was in the summer. He gave a speech in Suffolk County, New York, on island to a bunch of cops. And you may remember this, although you were probably not, I dunno, eight years ago, what was it? Five years ago, six years ago. You’re tuned in talking about how cops were too nice to people they arrested. They shouldn’t protect their heads when they put ’em in police cars. They should just slam ’em into the car, which I found absolutely appalling. We have a moral, legal and ethical obligation to take care of people in our custody. Even if we don’t approve of what they did, even if they’re in our custody, even if we’ve arrested them for breaking some law, we still have a moral, legal and ethical obligation to care for them. And so I wrote a letter to my entire workforce saying that and was out of work very shortly thereafter, which is fine, by the way.
(00:05:00):
I believe you should say what you believe and stand by it even when there are consequences to it. So like I said, put into one job by President Bush and another by President Obama then removed during Mr. Trump’s first term. I love the Department of Justice. I believe in its mission. I believe deeply in its mission. I had the opportunity to serve twice at the FBI once, as Kevin mentioned, as Jim Comey’s chief of staff, though I left that job to go run the DEA before. So all the stuff started before he gave his press conference, before the Clinton email investigation was opened. But much earlier in my career on Bob Mueller’s staff right after nine 11 when he was a new director and I was his counselor for national security, and that was an inflection point for the FBI. It was a time that the FBI manifestly changed its mission, right?
(00:05:58):
And the National Security Mission, the counter-terrorism mission, the counterintelligence mission became much larger and much more important. And it’s also a time when, for very good reasons that we should discuss the FBI centralized a lot of its casework. So the pre nine 11 model at the FBI remember there was a 1993, well, you won’t remember this, but you’ll know this. There was a 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center by Al-Qaeda. Familiar, right? Six people were killed in the subbasement. Al-Qaeda was behind the plot. The idea was to detonate a bomb in the subbasement of the World Trade Center, bring down the tower, didn’t work, six people were dead. FBI investigated it, but it was run out of the New York Field office of the FBI and the FBI app parlance. New York was what they call the office of origin. And that makes a lot of sense when you’re working at bank robbery.
(00:06:45):
The Kansas City is the office of origin or Topeka is the office of origin, but not when you’re working in international counter-terrorism or national security case. And so one of the things that Mueller did was he centralized the management of these big sprawling difficult, multi-jurisdictional multinational cases at headquarters. Something that I think the current leadership of the FBI doesn’t quite understand or appreciate and may dismantle, which I think would be to the detriment of the FBI and to our national security. But in any event, I got to work for Bob right after nine 11 at the FBI. So two tours there, and then a few tours at Maine Justice back and forth. Although my favorite job, if you ask me, and you wouldn’t have to pry the answer out of me, it was always a line at USA where I just had my agents and my cases and they left me the hell alone to do the work that I loved. So I miss it every day. I like talking about it. Happy to answer any questions that you have. But at first I have a couple of questions for you just to sort of center the FBI in this discussion. Anyone know here how big it is? How many people work there? Anyone have a guess? Don’t be shy.
(00:08:01):
3000 people. 3000 a little bit on the low end. It’s probably about 37, 30 8,000 of that. Let’s for math, for math purposes. But I appreciate that. For math purposes, let’s call it 39,000 because then the math works better. Of the 39,000, how many of them are FBI? Special agents? Oh, men and women with a badge and a gun? Everyone have a guess on that, please? 5,000 10, 20 13, about a third. That’s why I picked 39. About 13,000 men and women at the FB are special agents, badge and a gun. So one third of the FBI special agents. Two thirds are everything else. What’s everything else? Well, you have professional support staff, you have intel analysts, you have chemists, you have pilots. I mean, you name it, they have it, right? You have tech folks. It’s a pretty remarkably diverse and talented organization, but only about a third of them are FBI, special agents. Here’s why the math matters. How many men and women in the New York City Police Department are officers badging a gun? Anyone know? You want to guess? Both of them? Maybe? I’m sorry, I can’t hear you. Like
Speaker 3 (00:09:33):
25% of
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:09:34):
Them, right? But how many police officers are there in New York City? There are 13,000 FBI Special agents worldwide, right? 400 offices in the us, 75 offices abroad. 13,000 FBI, special agents worldwide. How many police officers do you have in New York City? 13,000. About 40,000? Yeah, actually, I think the number’s a little bit lower. They have some, but let’s say 38 7, 30 8,000. The FBI, the uniformed part, not uniform, I’m sorry, the badge carrying part of the FBI badge and gun, special agents, sworn law enforcement officers, about one third the size of the New York City Police Department, which is kind of remarkable if you think about it, because the FBI, which I guess the argument I’m trying to make, it’s a long-winded circular, but bear with me is relatively small.
(00:10:32):
It’s the third the size of the biggest police department in the country in New York City. It’s another way of saying it’s a finite resource. And so if a resource is finite, how do you use it? What do you do with it? How many cops are there? In the United States total? About 850,000, 900,000 total. And about 18,000 different police departments, virtually all of them, these men and women have the capacity to do drug and gun cases. And I’m not minimizing the importance of that work. That work matters in the communities in which these folks serve. But almost every cop in America can do a gun or drug case. So at least in my small brain doesn’t make a lot of sense to take a finite resource like the FBI, the best trained, most talented, best resourced law enforcement organization on the planet. And yeah, I’m biased. And use it in a way or to replicate work that a lot of other people are doing. So let’s talk about work that the FBI does uniquely meaning nobody else does it. Give me an example. What do you think? What’s something the FBI does that nobody else does?
Speaker 3 (00:11:55):
Interstate kidnapping.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:11:57):
Yeah. Yeah. So it’s a great example. So multi-jurisdictional stuff, right? There’s a reason why a cop, let’s say in St. Louis is probably not working a case in Chicago. They don’t have jurisdiction, but the FBI is not unique in the fact that they have multi-state jurisdiction. A TF has it. DEA has it. HSI has it, but yeah, that’s a part of it. And by the way, historically, at least that’s how the FBI kind of got started. It was car theft first. There were cars, and very shortly after he had cars, he had car theft and cars travel across state lines and insurance adjusters who were mostly trying to track down stolen cars in the day, didn’t have that sort of jurisdiction. And so you needed some organization that could work both in Missouri and Illinois. So that’s absolutely a part of it. That’s one of the things that gives them jurisdiction, but it doesn’t make them unique. What are the things the FBI does that no one else does. Sophie, do you have it? Domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism is, well, just
Speaker 3 (00:13:10):
Domestic terrorism.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:13:11):
Terrorism.
Speaker 3 (00:13:12):
Terrorism,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:13:12):
Yeah, absolutely. So you have a finite resource. You have a terrorism problem, both Sophie Domestic and international. And so it makes sense that you would ask, or at least if the FBI has developed an expertise in that, you’d want to make sure you protect it. And by the way, I’m not saying even though I am completely biased, that they are perfect. They are imperfect. Every human institution, including every institution for which each of you work is comprised of people. People are fallible and therefore we’re imperfect. The FBI makes plenty of mistakes. They get stuff wrong. But they have really, truly, Sophie developed an expertise in national security work, whether it’s international terrorism or domestic terrorism. What else? What’s that? Embezzlement white. So great point. There are other agencies that can do white collar crime. But to Michael’s point, once it becomes multi-jurisdictional or to your point, once it becomes very complex, there are fewer.
(00:14:19):
When I was a lion prosecutor, I used to love working with the, believe it or not, the US Postal Inspection Service. I dunno if you’ve even heard of them, but there’s a small federal law enforcement cadre there, and they’re really, really, really good, including at white collar crime. But they’re tiny and, and so if you have a lead on a case, let’s say you’re in St. Louis as an FBI agent, you need something done in Lisbon that’s easy for the FBI. That would be almost impossible for the postal inspection service. So big complicated white collar cases including cyber cases, healthcare fraud, insider trading, things like that. Again, the FBI, unlike the national security work. So where there really are sort of the only show in town, there are other agencies that do white collar work, but I would submit not as well and not at the same level of complexity. What else? There’s really, there’s two really important types of crime that the FBI does almost uniquely.
(00:15:25):
And asking them to stop that or to shift their resources elsewhere, I think is a grave mistake. Corruption, public corruption. That’s exactly right. I would go so far to say is that almost nobody else does that. And how many of you have grew up in a place where there was a lot of public corruption? A city, Chicago, Providence, Rhode Island, something like that. Where did you grow up? New Orleans. New Orleans. Great example. Unfortunately, you asked for it soon, but I mean, people sort of understand how things got done in New Orleans, right? You needed a zoning waiver approved, there’s a way to get it done. There’s a slow lawful way and there’s a quick unlawful way. And how many of you grew up in towns or communities where it didn’t exist whenever I obviously no one here from Vermont, but there are communities in which you really don’t see public corruption.
(00:16:33):
It hasn’t worked its way into the community. People would be outraged. They would report it and other places they just sort of hold their nose and go along with it. But the FBI does public corruption almost exclusively. And if you care about that kind of work, and I would tell you it’s unbelievably hard and unbelievably important, there’s really nobody else who’s going to do it. What else? One more really big one. Civil rights enforcement. Criminal civil rights enforcement. So even though they’re only 13,000, even though they’re only about a third, the size of the New York City Police Department, there are certain things they do that nobody else does or nobody else does as well. And so the notion that we’re going to take this cadre of men and women who I think are really the best of the best at their job, imperfect, I admit that upfront, but the best of the best at their job and move them to things that 850,000 other cops could do strikes me as insane and a misallocation of expertise and resources. So Kevin, to your introduction, I’m deeply worried.
(00:17:45):
And by the way, it’s not always the case that outsiders shouldn’t come in or kick the tires or make changes. There’s plenty of things I can think of at the FBI that ought to be changed and that haven’t. And so having a fresh set of eyes on it is not inherently a bad thing, but if you don’t fundamentally understand what they are and what they do, then mucking around with it I think can be really dangerous. Alright, that’s my pitch. What’s on your mind? I know you said you just want me to talk, but I would rather Skyler. Yes.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:18:26):
And by the way, if I’m not making sense or something I said seems stupid or doesn’t resonate, just tell me. I may not be able to fix it, but I’ll try.
Skylar Woodhouse | Bloomberg News (00:18:34):
Thanks for being here. So kind of a wordy question, but obviously nine 11 happened and there was a lot of changes post nine 11 in terms of you could talk about airports, how you go through security and the country has prided itself on avoiding another terrible event like nine 11. Sure, things have happened.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:18:58):
There have been a number of attempts and there have been small attacks that have succeeded, but nothing on that scale.
Skylar Woodhouse | Bloomberg News (00:19:04):
Yeah, we see things happening all the time. But given the current climate of the country politics, who’s taking positions like Cashel at the FBI, how concerned are you that the US could be opening itself to some risk on the national security front on the,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:19:26):
No, not a worded question, Skylar. Good question. So look, there’s always risk. It was never zero. Even when the FBI threw half of its workforce at in the international terrorism problem post nine 11, it was never zero. They’re really good at it, but they’re also good at it because they work in cooperation with partners around the world, both in law enforcement and the intelligence communities. And so having credibility overseas, having partnerships overseas, having relationships overseas is part of what keeps us safe. I worry that we’re really stressing that right now. However, at some level, in any new administration, Republican or Democrat, and I don’t give a rat’s ass about politics, there is always some turmoil at the top. I think at working levels it’s going to be okay. I think the men and women who’ve been doing this for a long time and have been doing it together are going to continue to do what they’ve been doing. But are we more vulnerable when there’s turmoil? Sure. Are we more vulnerable when there’s a lot of noise in the system? Sure. And are we more vulnerable when really good people are either walked out the door or begin to question whether or not they should stay? Sure. So never a non-zero risk, but I think it’s a riskier environment when there’s turmoil and there seems to be a good bit of that right now. Yeah.
Shrai Popat | PBS NewsHour (00:20:57):
Sorry, Rey.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:20:58):
Rey,
Shrai Popat | PBS NewsHour (00:20:59):
Who you with? Rey. With PBS NewsHour. Okay. I wanted to ask a little bit about following for Sky’s question about Cash Patel. Don Bonino characters who are now taps to lead the FBI and are leading the FBI who allegedly are leading with retribution. So are focused on targeting political enemies or people they see as political enemies and is a two parter, basically one, how detrimental is that for the agency writ large and two,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:21:25):
Well, how detrimental is that for society writ large
Shrai Popat | PBS NewsHour (00:21:29):
Society writ large? And also how detrimental is it in terms of the agency getting to focus on important work in terms of protecting the country?
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:21:38):
Yeah, so I sort of answered one of those, but elliptically, so let me make it more clear. Rey, when there are lots of law enforcement officers in the country, 850,000 or so who could do guns and drugs and gangs and stuff like that, I think it’s a misapplication of finite resources to suddenly put FBI agents on immigration task forces, for instance, right? If you’re getting away from the core of their work, understand that it comes at a cost. It may mean less complicated white collar investigations. It may mean that we are Sophie more vulnerable to some sort of attack.
(00:22:23):
There’s a fine line re, right? Because you do want the outside perspective. I think there’s some value in that, but I think it is more valuable and it’s people who appreciate, and I’m not really answering your question, so I want you to ask it again, but I think it’s more valuable and it’s people who understand what the role of the FBI needs to be to keep us safe. I don’t want to talk about specific leaders. I am astonished that there are people who don’t know, don’t care, don’t care to learn. I’ll give you an example. I had spent my entire life in the Department of Justice when I went to the DEA, however I was new to it. So even though I had been a prosecutor, I’d been a US attorney, I’d been at the FBI, I’d done all these things at Maine Justice in the field, I still didn’t know it.
(00:23:11):
I didn’t do anything to change it. For about 12 months, I spent 12 months traveling around the country talking to intelligence analysts, talking to diversion investigators, talking to special agents, talking to task force officers. I talked to every group within the DE hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of meetings until I began to feel like I understood what some of the problems were. It would’ve been idiocy for me to come in and tell them what needed to be fixed on day one. It would’ve been arrogant and it would’ve been stupid and it would’ve been wrong. And so whoever you are and whatever you’re leading, whatever thing you’re working on, I mean the best leaders, this may sound odd, actually are incredibly humble. They know they don’t know a bunch of stuff and they shut up and they listen until they learn because nobody learns by talking.
(00:24:11):
And that’s what worries me the most. Right? You don’t learn by talking, you learn by listening. Are there things that the FBI that need to be fixed? Absolutely. Did I know what they were at the DEA in the first year? Barely. It probably would’ve taken me five to really learn the organization and more than that to really learn it like someone who comes up through the ranks. But the closest I could get to it because I had to do something at some point, was to talk to as many people as quickly as I could and listen and try and ingest that stuff. And so I’m always worried I’m not talking about Bino or Patel directly about people who think they know when they can’t possibly. Yeah. Tell me your name.
Audrey Decker | Defense One (00:24:58):
Hi Audrey with Defense one.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:25:01):
Okay. What’s Defense one.
Audrey Decker | Defense One (00:25:02):
Defense one. I cover the DOD.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:25:05):
Got it.
Audrey Decker | Defense One (00:25:06):
But I’m curious about just this whole plan to decentralize the FBI. And I know you probably, you’re not inside cash Patel’s mind, you can’t really tell what he’s thinking. But I guess, do you have any theories on why he’s doing this? The underlying motive? Does he not understand? Does he just actually want to dismantle the FBI?
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:25:31):
Well, I mean he has, he said a few things outside of government, Audrey that make me wonder and worry. So let’s start with this. Are there too many people at FBI headquarters? Are there too many people at the Pentagon? Probably. Probably. So are there too many people at FBI headquarters? Probably Should some of them be moved to the field? Probably. Where should they go? Just to the field. So if you’re going to take resources from here and move it to all these places over there, you would want to understand where the threat is, how we are aligned against the threat. What threats do you want to work, by the way, what’s the threat you want to work? Because if the threat you want to work is cyber, well, the field could be anywhere. You don’t have to have somebody in Pittsburgh to work a Pittsburgh cyber threat if the threat is public corruption.
(00:26:43):
Maybe you want more people in New Orleans working public corruption. So you have to measure the threat. You have to understand the threat, you have to prioritize your work and then you can realign to it. So it’s not as easy as just saying too many people at headquarters, Audrey, let’s move ’em all to the field. That would be crazy. But I think there probably are too many people at headquarters. And so is there a thoughtful, rational, efficient way of doing that? Absolutely. But it takes time and you can’t know it on day one. You can’t know it on week one and you can’t know it on month one. So am I for that rebalancing? Sure. We should always be looking since we are finite with our resources at what the threat is, how we prioritize it, and how we’re going to realign to meet it.
(00:27:35):
I don’t know what that is. FBI has a very sophisticated prioritization matrix that they use. They sometimes call it banding where they band. Each field office is asked within a certain articulated framework, asked to ban their threats. So where are you from, Audrey? I’m from Annapolis, Maryland. Okay. So in Annapolis, what’s the threat in Annapolis, for instance, I would’ve suggested there’s probably a significant counterintelligence threat. The United States Naval Academy is there, I mean you wouldn’t ignore that if you were baning threats in Annapolis. Is there a violent crime threat in Annapolis? Is there a public corruption threat? It is the state capitol. It’s not that bad. Good.
(00:28:23):
But in other words, what I’m getting at though is you would look at the community and try and figure out what are the problems in Annapolis, and then you would align your resources to that. Now that means moving some people from headquarters, let’s just say in Annapolis, there’s no violent crime threat. It would make no sense to take people out of headquarters and put ’em on a violent crime task force in Annapolis where it might make a ton of sense to take people out of headquarters and put ’em on a violent crime task force in Memphis or in East St. Louis. So you have to understand the threat and you have to align your resources to it. So just saying too many people at headquarters, let’s get ’em in the field. Right. Doesn’t make any sense to me at all. Yeah.
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:29:13):
Before we go to the next question, I just wanted to follow up real quick because I’m old enough to remember the, probably the biggest threat to the FBI’s existence as we knew it was post nine 11
Speaker 3 (00:29:29):
When
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:29:30):
There were calls for the bureau to be broken up
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:29:34):
Into an MI five MI six model that correct the Brits use, correct.
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:29:38):
Yeah.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:29:39):
I was on Mueller’s staff at the time,
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:29:41):
And that’s why I asked the question, what do you credit as sort of we’re looking at a new kind of dynamic with the BI now questions about how to change your whether to change it. What did you attribute to the FBI’s survival
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:30:00):
Back then?
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:30:00):
Back then?
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:30:01):
Yeah. Bob Mueller and the enormous, first of all, brilliant guy, enormous credibility, absolutely working for him, by the way, was the professional honor of a lifetime. I tell people I would walk barefoot on broken glass for Bob Mueller. I also tell people that working for him felt like that every single day. I got in at four 15 every morning to start my day and left when he left around eight o’clock, eight 30 at night every day. I don’t mean Monday through Friday. I mean nobody worked as hard or as much as Bob Mueller, but he didn’t. And as smart as he was, Princeton guy, university of Virginia Law School knew there were things he didn’t know Kevin. He had that humility. And so he learned, right? He actually met with Eliza Manningham Buller, who I think was she MI five or MI six? Do you recall?
Speaker 3 (00:30:58):
I don’t
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:30:58):
Recall. Someone could look it up real quickly. But the point being he spoke with his British counterparts and law enforcement and intelligence understood the virtues of their model and also the weaknesses of their model. What he had heard from the Brits over and over was that the FBI has it right. They have both things under the same roof. MI five is essentially domestic intelligence in Britain. MI six James Bond is international intel work. The FBI does all of it. And they also have a criminal component. And what a number of the Brits told Bob was, your model actually is better than our model. It’s more efficient. It’s all in the same place. You can learn it here and you can action it here. You don’t have to send it out. And so Mueller, I think force of personality, intellect, all of those things sort of learned what he needed to learn, understood it deeply. Gathered tons of information, Kevin, and had the credibility on the hill to keep it intact. There was a lot of interest in breaking it up, Mueller, by the way, how quaint was confirmed, 98 to zero. You may never see that again, but truly bipartisan support for a guy who absolutely had earned bipartisan support. What else? Yeah, over here, and then we’ll come back to Sophie. Tell me your name.
Hannah Demissie | ABC News (00:32:30):
Oh, sorry. My name’s Hannah Dee. I work at a BC news.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:32:33):
Okay.
Hannah Demissie | ABC News (00:32:33):
I guess wanted to talk to you or ask you questions about intelligence sharing
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:32:37):
And
Hannah Demissie | ABC News (00:32:38):
The importance of it. And you talked about how the chaos right now doesn’t make it easy considering chaos leads to distrust. And I’m curious your thoughts with the US pausing, intelligent sharing or partially pausing, intelligent sharing with Ukraine, Our allies might view that and your concerns about them possibly pausing or not sharing intelligence with us.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:33:02):
I worry about that all the time and I worried about it when, I’ll even go back further. When Mr. Trump in his first term disclosed classified information in the Oval Office to Russians, I mean, so if you’re the country passing that to us, you’re the country sharing that with us. Might you pause before you do that again? I think so. So I worry about that all the time, but I don’t mean to suggest that Mr. Trump is the only concern. Leaks are a concern in my view. Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden and all those other folks are concerns. We want to talk about this too, by the way. The phrase sources and methods. What does that mean? I had A-T-S-S-C-I clear, right? So I saw lots of stuff and sometimes I’m reading it and I’m like, why the hell is this classified? This seems so completely meaningless. And we probably do have an over classification problem in our country, not probably. We have an over classification problem in our country. We also have a problem of not declassifying fully and quickly enough. Why do you think we have those two problems? They have the same root cause. What do you think it is?
Speaker 8 (00:34:18):
People are worried about being penalized for
Speaker 3 (00:34:22):
Not classifying something.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:34:22):
They’re worried about being wrong. That’s exactly right. So the bureaucratic instinct, Sophie, is I’m not going to get in trouble if I classify this thing and I’m not going to get in trouble if I keep it classified. And it’s much easier to do that than to make a decision about declassifying it or assigning a lower classification to it. And so there’s a bureaucratic impulse, and I don’t mean a malicious one, but an understandable one to classify things too highly and to keep them classified too long with that. When we talk about sources and methods, what do we mean? What is it?
(00:35:00):
What does that mean? It’s how we get stuff. How do we get stuff? There’s human, there’s sign, there’s emin. Human intelligence, signals intelligence, image intelligence. We have lots of ways of getting, there’s osint, open source intelligence. There’s lots of ways of getting stuff if you’re not. But when I’m a consumer, Sophie of highly classified material, I don’t know if the person who classified it just did it out of bureaucratic impulse or because the stuff is really, really truly classified and ought to be up here. And that includes what’s your favorite flavor of ice cream? I don’t know. Chocolate. Chocolate. Alright. Perfectly good choice. Didn’t mean to ask you such a hard question. I caught you off guard mine too, by the way. So let’s say you lead a foreign country. You’re the prime minister of Latvia, and I read an intel product. This is entirely made up. I read an intel product prior to your visit to the United States that let’s make you the leader of North Korea. Makes it more interesting. Okay? And I read an intel product that tells me that the exalted leader love chocolate ice cream. Should that be classified? Audrey says No. Why?
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:36:24):
It’s just ice cream.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:36:26):
But Michael says yes. Why
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:36:28):
Lets people know how to hurry Favor with you.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:36:36):
So Audrey, I disagree with you and you’re getting closer. Make an argument, Audrey, even though you don’t think that Sophie’s love for chocolate, ice cream ought to be classified, make an argument for why it ought to be classified.
Audrey Decker | Defense One (00:36:51):
Yeah,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:36:51):
What I do, I’m so
Audrey Decker | Defense One (00:36:53):
Sorry. Why it ought to be classified?
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:36:55):
Yeah, why It ought to be. I know you disagree, but make an argument for why it ought to be classified. Michael’s getting closer. Or you can like one of those game shows, you can ask for help from the audience. You want to ask for help.
Audrey Decker | Defense One (00:37:10):
Well, yeah, I guess along those lines it could be looked at as a weakness.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:37:18):
Okay, so more like Michael said, Curry favor, weakness. Leah, did you have something? It could be poisoned, it could be. Well, we’re not, we all like Sophie, even though she brought, we’re not going to poison Sophie, but how about No, no. Fair enough. But how about this, Audrey? What if the only person in North Korea who knows that Sophie likes chocolate ice cream is her personal chef? What if he is a mole for the United States? What if the CIA is running him as a single source of information about the dietary habits of the leader of North Korea? What if that fact gets out that you like chocolate ice cream? How many people know that Sophie one. One, what happens to him? Probably not. Something good bullet in the back of the head. So sometimes by sources and methods, we’re talking about how we learn something, not necessarily what that something is. It doesn’t matter if the answer is pistachio or chocolate. It matters that we know it and we know it because we’re running a highly sensitive source in a unique position to give us perhaps other information. So I don’t know how the hell I got off on this tangent, but there is an over classification problem. We do classify things too long, but there is often a very good reason why things are highly classified. What started this damn thing, Kevin? I don’t even remember. Alright.
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:39:01):
Sources and methods and
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:02):
Sources. Yeah, but what started that Hannah asked about
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:39:05):
Ukraine. Ukraine
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:06):
And what started that? Alright, what next question. What are you all thinking about? Yeah, let’s
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:39:15):
First.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:17):
Oh, I’m sorry. Tell me your name.
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:39:18):
I’m Haley Bullis with the Washington Examine
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:20):
Haley. Okay.
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:39:22):
So you mentioned civil rights and all of that oil of the FBI and civil liberties enforcing that and protecting him. I think it was about a week ago now, president Trump posted on two socials essentially saying protests in college campuses should be considered illegal.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:41):
Illegal.
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:39:42):
Yes.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:42):
Okay.
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:39:43):
Must
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:43):
Have missed that one.
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:39:45):
There’s been a lot. Don’t blame you. But do you have any concerns about how the FBA might be utilized in these protest cases or instance?
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:39:55):
Well, so the original concerns, it’s a finite resource with a workforce trained to do things that are really important and unique to them. So zero sum game, right? You start doing X, that may mean you’re not doing Y, but look, right? I mean, if you look at the dialogue, the domestic investigations, operations guidelines for the FBI, it’s this big thick book. They are, again, not perfectly. So every human institution is fallible and flawed in some way, but they’re really, really, really good at being really, really, really careful about First Amendment implications of their work. So I would be worried generally, not just about the FBI, if that became a focus of law enforcement activity, what people say, how they say it, where they say it, why they say it. I think that’s a perilous path for a democracy. So I think it’s broader than an FBI issue.
(00:41:01):
I didn’t see what he said. I don’t know of anything afoot to actually do that. I mean universities, whatever the kids are saying ought to be. As long as they’re not in siding, a riot or something like that ought to be places where people can speak freely. I teach at Georgetown. I teach national security law and policy. I actually don’t teach in the law school. I teach undergraduate. And you may be surprised, but I have a lot of divergent views in my classroom, which I think is absolutely awesome. And I want to make it a place where people can say what they think or ask dumb questions. Actually, very few of the questions are dumb. These are pretty smart kids. I would hate if somebody were sitting in the back of the classroom monitoring what those kids were saying that would just like, I would hate if anyone were telling you what you could or could not write. So that is a perilous path. Yeah. Granted. Then we’ll come here to, is it Bel? Bel?
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:42:03):
Okay. Hey, grant Schwab with the Detroit News, but I’m based here in Washington. Okay. How big
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:42:09):
Is there? A Washington?
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:42:10):
It used to be a lot bigger.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:42:12):
It’s grants.
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:42:13):
It’s two myself and a bureau chief 30 years ago it was like 12, 15 people.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:42:19):
Really?
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:42:19):
Yeah.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:42:20):
Wow.
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:42:20):
Anywho, here we are. You said you feel that despite kind of the turmoil at the top of the bureau that the working levels will be okay.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:42:30):
I do believe that Grant, I could also be wrong, but I do believe that.
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:42:34):
Why do you believe that? Do you have a relationship still with people in the bureau who tell you, Hey, things look okay for us?
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:42:42):
Two things. One is I’m old and I’ve been around for a while and I understand. I think the nature of these institutions, those values are pretty deeply rooted. I don’t think it’s impossible to undo that. I think it’s very, very difficult to undo that. And I do talk to people in US attorney’s offices and FBI offices who for the most part, whatever the noise up here may be, grant, they’re just doing their work. Now, I will also say this, I’ve lived through enough changes in administration. So this attorney general comes in and he wants to do project safe childhood. And this attorney general comes in and she wants to do Project Safe neighborhood. And there’s a bank fraud task force and there’s a savings and loan crisis and there’s a healthcare fraud effort. And so there’s always some of that change. There’s always some shift. By and large, the work looks the same in Detroit and it will look the same 10 years from now as it did 10 years ago. But the first conversation I had with Sophie, I do worry if the FBI starts doing things that everyone else can do and isn’t doing things that nobody else can do. So Sibel Abel? Yeah. Wait, I think they want you to have a microphone.
Cybele Mayes-Osterman | USA Today (00:44:07):
So I’m Cybele with USA today.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:44:11):
Kevin’s old shop.
Cybele Mayes-Osterman | USA Today (00:44:12):
Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I think what I’m wondering is just, I’m sure there will be people in the FBI, even if they’re not at the lower levels, who if we start to see people in the FBI who are getting orders where they’re questioning the legality of this, are people starting to feel from within the organization? Like they’re getting improper directives and stuff like this as reporters? How can we keep on the pulse of that and be a safe place for those people to come out and be able to talk and blow the whistle in a way that wouldn’t compromise them?
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:44:54):
Yeah, that’s a great question. So I don’t know that most agents or most prosecutors will ever talk to you. And I would tell you that when I was there, I would never talk to you. And so those who do, I’m not saying they’re wrong, but as always, you should be circumspect. There’s a small number that come forward and a smaller number of those who are sort of knowledgeable, thoughtful, and accurate when you start to, because I read a bunch of papers every day and even the very best get a bunch of stuff wrong. They’re reporting it accurately, but it’s not accurate. Does that make sense?
(00:45:45):
That’s a hard question to answer. I mean, you got to do what we do in investigations. You got to talk to as many people as you can. You got to circle the problem over and over and over again, and you got to get people who wouldn’t ordinarily talk to you to talk to you. The agent in Detroit who thinks she knows what the problem is, but has never been to headquarters or has never been to another field office, may not have the entire story, or she may. And it’s hard for you to know that because you are truly an outsider to that organization. And so I always felt when I was conducting investigations, I was a pain in
the ass. I wanted to talk to everyone and know everything. And there is a diminishing marginal return. And at some point you have to write your story and I get that.
(00:46:38):
But sometimes tapping on the brake, slowing down and talking to an extra person, I think is good practice. By the way, I think this is really cool. You guys and I, there may be some other, but it’s the only two lines of work I know of where we have to, where we routinely admit we get stuff wrong publicly. I mean, it’s really cool. I have an absolute obligation as a prosecutor to go into court and tell a judge I screwed up absolute obligation and I took it seriously and I did it any number of times, your Honor, yesterday I said X, it turns out that it’s not X, it’s Y, and either I’ll do better next time or here’s why I got it wrong. You guys do that every day, right? I mean, it’s an amazing thing if you think about it, to publish your mistakes either in court or in a newspaper.
(00:47:37):
We will never avoid that. But by tapping on the brakes and talking to more people and slowing down a little bit, you can minimize it. You also have a different pressure than I did as a prosecutor. If I had somebody on the streets who was hurting people, then I had to move really fast. But if I’m doing a big white collar investigation like we had talked about, right? I have more time. People may lose money, but no one’s going to die. You guys are always under pressure to publish, I think. I mean, how many of you are permitted to work on long form thought pieces? Raise your hands. 1, 2, 3 and a half. Okay. Where do you work? I work
Grant Schwab | The Detroit News (00:48:19):
At National Journal, but I also do write newsletters
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:48:23):
Every week. Okay, so you have both. Yeah. And you get to do both.
Cybele Mayes-Osterman | USA Today (00:48:28):
Yeah, if I’m lucky,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:48:29):
If you’re lucky, but not ordinarily.
(00:48:32):
And you get to do both Christian Science monitor, but most of you didn’t raise your hand, meaning most of you are under pressure to get it out yesterday. And certainly CNN before M-S-N-B-C, damn them gets to it, right Michael? And so you have a countervailing pressure, and I think it can lead to bad journalism. By the way, this’ll sound like I’m sucking up to you guys. I’m not. I am incredibly grateful that you all have chosen this path of to get paid less than you would anywhere else, to work harder than you would anywhere else, and to get yelled at more than you would anywhere else in a time when our institutions are faltering. Congress is completely feckless. And that’s not new. I don’t mean to suggest that if you’re covering it, they’re not a good story. I mean, car crashes tend to make good stories and Congress is one long car crash. But when the executive branch is changing in ways that are unfamiliar to most people, there’s only two things left. I actually believe there are two things left. The courts and you. So I am unbelievably grateful that you are doing what you’re doing because it’s really, really hard. And the environment in which you’re doing it is more difficult now than I think it ever has been. Is that fair, Kevin? I think it’s
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:50:07):
More than fair. Yeah. It’s hard to imagine a time when an administration would call out the press
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:50:17):
In
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:50:17):
A way that it has.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:50:18):
Yeah, I’m thinking yes, but even beyond that, right? I mean faith, you look at Gallup polling
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:50:25):
Or
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:50:25):
Polling, public
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:50:26):
Trust,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:50:27):
Public trust and institutions, not just the media. I mean Congress is now an asterisk. They don’t even rate a one or a two in public approval ratings. They’re an asterisk. But public approval, public confidence in academia, big business in religion, in law enforcement, in the courts, everything is cratering. And it may have dissuaded some people from doing the kind of work that you guys are doing. I get that. But I’m unbelievably grateful that you’re doing it. It is more important now than ever. Like I said, I think we have two institutions left, you guys and the courts. And I’m worried about the courts. What
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:51:13):
Else? A question? Who’s got another question? I don’t want to interfere. Okay, let’s go over here first
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:51:19):
Stephanie,
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:51:20):
And I’ll save mine.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:51:21):
How much time do we have?
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:51:23):
Just a few more.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:51:24):
Alright. What time is it Sabel? 1215. Alright. What do you guys have after this?
Speaker 3 (00:51:30):
Just lunch.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:51:31):
Lunch. Am I with standing between you and lunch? Exactly. Oh God, I am so sorry.
Stephanie Lai | Bloomberg News (00:51:37):
Thank you so much. Stephanie Live with Bloomberg News. I guess my question is sort of related to the methods that FBI agents use. I know that in the last couple of years there’s been a lot of pushback on just federal law enforcement, law enforcement in general, how they treat people. And I’m just curious,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:51:52):
Go ahead.
Stephanie Lai | Bloomberg News (00:51:52):
I’m curious where that stands nowadays with F fbi. I, well,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:51:56):
It’s a broad question. How do they treat people,
Stephanie Lai | Bloomberg News (00:52:00):
I guess in terms of treatment of people that they’re arresting and then just in general, all the pushback that we’d seen in 2020 with the George Floyd protests.
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:52:09):
Right? But so
Stephanie Lai | Bloomberg News (00:52:12):
I guess
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:52:12):
Derek Chauvin murdered George Floyd. Let’s be clear about what happened. That wasn’t a lawful arrest, that wasn’t a lawful detention. It was a crime, but that wasn’t the FBI,
Stephanie Lai | Bloomberg News (00:52:24):
Right? But my question is, has that translated at all to the FBI in terms of how methods of treating people that are? Yeah,
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:52:32):
No, look, I mean my experience, and I can only talk to mine, Stephanie, is that they are extremely professional. Again, human institution. Some people are flawed or some people the FBI flawed, absolutely. But I think overall the ethos is very professional, high level of responsibility, high level of training. But every time, and this is why I wrote my letter to my entire workforce after President Trump made those comments about cops roughing up people in their custody. We spend our entire career trying to build bridges to the communities that we serve. And your question captures it perfectly. Something awful happens. And let’s be clear, what happened to George Floyd was awful. It was a crime. It was a murder. And then someone will say, law enforcement sucks. Look at the way they treated George Floyd. Alright, let’s do some math. I said before there were about 850, 900,000 men and women in law enforcement.
(00:53:30):
What percentage of those men and women do you think suck at their job? They’re dishonest, they’re corrupt, they’re in for the wrong reason. They’re evil, they’re violent. They’re looking to hurt people. Tell me what percentage you think that describes. I mean, you would all agree with me that some percent are in for the right reason. Right? They care deeply about their communities. They want to serve, they’re passionate about that. They’re kind. They’re thoughtful, they’re honest, right? That’s a non-zero number, right Stephanie? Alright. What percentage do you think are in for absolutely the wrong reasons. Just give me a number.
(00:54:08):
10%, 5%, 2%. I’m talking about the worst. I’m not talking about lazy. I’m talking about violent and corrupt. What percent? Alright, I’ll pick a number. Let’s just say, I’m just making this up. 5%. If there are 800,000 cops in America, then 40,000 of them, 5% would be the worst of the worst of the worst. What are the odds that one of those people is going to do something like Derek Chauvin did to George Floyd? Relatively high. If you have 40,000 people running around somewhere in the country, most people would say in your line of work, are 95% of the reporters really hard working, really thoughtful? Are they? Do you have that percentage? Not a chance. But I would also suggest that you don’t have a 10% corruption rate. You might have people who aren’t very good, who aren’t very industrious, who aren’t very smart, but 10% of them aren’t corrupt. If the number of people in law enforcement, again, I’m just making up the numbers, Stephanie is only 5%. That’s 40,000 cops capable of doing what Derek Chauvin did to George Floyd. And so every time something like that happens, it’s what ascribed to the broader community. Fair or unfair? I think the answer is both. How do you solve that problem?
(00:55:40):
It’s a really hard problem to solve. So does it make sense that people would lose faith in the church if there’s a corruption scandal or faith in the courts? If a judge turns out to be taking money on the side or faith in law enforcement if there’s a Derek Chauvin out on the streets, sure. Because that’s what we’re seeing and hearing. It doesn’t describe the majority of people in that industry far from it. But it’s an enormous problem. That’s why I wrote my letter, because I think any good cop, any good FBI agent would tell you that undoes so much of the work we’re trying to do, just as it must make you sick. Sick, right? I forget her name, it was some number of years ago, but the Washington Post reporter who was making up her stories, Janet Cook, Janet Cook, Janet Cook. I mean if you’re a journalist who cares passionately about your trade, about your work and somebody does that to you and suddenly none of us believe what you write or what you say, how do you feel Stephanie? Not good. Right? Same problem. Time for another question and then lunch. What’s for lunch by the way?
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:56:53):
Tacos if you’re interested
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:56:56):
Could be
Kevin Johnson/NPF (00:56:59):
Not seeing any. Yep. Yeah. Passed down.
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:57:10):
Hi. But going back to the letter that you wrote, you wrote it and then you said you were removed shortly after
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:57:16):
I was, was given the option to transfer to some that sanctuary city enforcement team option that you saw some of the senior people at DOJ getting. It was not unlike that.
Speaker 3 (00:57:30):
So
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:57:31):
I resigned in lieu of being fired or in lieu of being transferred. I’m not sure what the hell happened to me, but
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:57:39):
Obviously you said you stand by writing that letter
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:57:43):
A hundred percent.
Hailey Bullis | Washington Examiner (00:57:45):
What was the response you got from the people that worked with you every day and when you sent that letter out and then I
Chuck Rosenberg/Crowell & Moring (00:57:52):
Heard from people all over the country and all levels of law enforcement saying, thank you.
(00:57:57):
I also worry deeply because the last thing, you don’t want to make this about you and you don’t want to drag your people and your organization into some fight that they didn’t pick. So I understand why a lot of people said nothing, but I think saying nothing sometimes is the road to hell. And so I can’t tell you that I lightly wrote that email. When you hit send on an email to 11,000 people, one of you guys is going to get that in milliseconds. This case was the New York Times. They wrote a very nice editorial about me. That was the end of me.
(00:58:41):
So you don’t do those things lightly. Just as when we were talking about people who come forward, you have to be circumspect. You have to question motives, you have to circle the problem. You have to talk to lots of people. But I think silence is the road to hell in that situation. Silence is a scent. And to Stephanie’s question, right? I mean that’s the thing that troubles me the most. If we stand by and we say nothing, then it’s tacit approval. And sometimes that’s just unacceptable. Not everything is a fight. And there are plenty of policy decisions. During my time in the Department of Justice, things we vehemently disagreed about, raised voices behind closed doors, happens all the time. And sometimes you’re on the short end of those and sometimes you’re on the long end of those, doesn’t matter. That’s not about ethics or morality or those are usually about strategy or tactics. And you lose some of those and you move on. You only get to resign once or you only get to send an email like that once. And so you have to really be careful about picking your battles and not just do it because you disagree. I mean, have any of you already lost editorial fights? Have you resigned?
(00:59:59):
Is it conceivable you would? Is there some matter where your editor says, do X? And you say, I’m out of here. I mean, that’s happening in newsrooms right now, isn’t it? Isn’t that happening? Who’s at the post It’s? It’s happening right now. I would just say you’re going to have lots of arguments in your professional careers. Arguments are healthy if they’re done in the right way. I don’t urge you to resign because you disagree about an editorial judgment, but it’s sort of the potter steward definition of pornography from the 1963 case. I forget what two, but you know it when you see it, right? And there may come a time in your professional life when you see it and you know it’s wrong and you walk out the door, that’s okay too. Alright, go get lunch. Thanks Chuck. Thank you very much.
###
