Bilahari Kausikan Transcript: June 25, 2025
Kevin Johnson, NPF (00:00:01):
To cap the last session of this conference, we always save the best for last and last year Bilahari Kausikan suggested that we might be bordering on ‘reckless’ was his word for inviting him back a third time to speak at this conference. I’d argue that we would be reckless if we did not. We are so grateful that he’s here once again. For number four, fewer public officials, current or former are as shrewd observers of foreign affairs than Bilahari. A former permanent secretary for Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in nearly four decades at the ministry he has served both here and abroad, including as ambassador to the Russian Federation and as permanent representative to the United Nations in New York. He also spent a considerable time in D.C. His informed and no holds barred commentary is both instructive and refreshing. I think you’ll find it so. It’s also why we love to reserve the last word for him, so please welcome Bilahari.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:01:20):
Thank you. That was far too kind an introduction. Can you all hear me OK? Because I’m always in a dilemma. If I have a handheld mic, I feel I ought to sing. I’m sitting on this high chair, which I say I thought I must because the camera can’t see me otherwise, I feel I ought to have a drink in my hand. It’s like a bar stool, right? Anyway, thank you for inviting me again since this is the fourth time it is now confirmed you are reckless. You want redemption, right? Because this is a fourth time, I thought I would take a slightly different approach.
(00:01:59):
I will talk about the issues of the day, the war, the war in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and of course US-China competition. But I want to frame it slightly different in terms of observations I’ve made primarily from your profession, but not only your profession, including increasingly too often academics and public officials too diplomats, intelligence officers as well. And I’m going to make two observations and I try to be as brief as I can so that we can have maximum time for discussion. First of all, I think I have noticed increasingly all these groups of people, journalists, public officials, academics, pundits of all kinds, they generally pay far too much attention to events and not enough attention to the processes in which events are necessarily buried. Now, of course you have to pay attention to events because, but you need to see events in a certain perspective in or4der to present them accurately.
(00:03:18):
Ever since the war in Ukraine broke out, there’s certain apocalyptical note has crept into a lot of reporting, not just by journalists but by academics, by and indeed in policy papers made by public officials as if the end of the world is nigh or the world as we know it is nigh. I’m not saying that the war in Ukraine and the other wars, the war in the Middle East, these are not consequential events. Of course there are consequential events, but are they unusual events? I don’t think they’re unusual events, conflict or competition and therefore at least the possibility of conflict and or very often real conflict are inherent characteristics of international relations.
(00:04:16):
They’re never absent from international relations. It’s whether we choose to focus on them or not. It’s often said that this war in the Ukraine is the biggest war that has occurred in Europe since the second World War, and probably that’s true, although there was a small unpleasantness, which is much nastier than this war in some respects in the Balkans in the mid nineties. Don’t forget that much nastier because it was a genocidal conflict and there has been conflict in the Sudan. There’s been conflict in the democratic republic, DRC of Congo for how many years? Maybe 50 years, half a century. How many millions have died there? I can’t know. I don’t know. I was looking up some figures and now you can only get estimates. Yeah, nobody cares. Why? Because in Europe I put it once in a much more crude way and some European ambassadors were deeply offended, but they could not, I don’t care about offending them.
(00:05:22):
I said, can you refute me? And they couldn’t. I said, it’s only unique in that for the first time in a very long time, not so long. If you take for the Balkan wars, white people are killing white people instead of white people killing brown people or encouraging brown people to kill each other. If you want to put it very crudely, that is what makes this Ukraine war unique. He didn’t have much to say about that except he said, it’s kind of racist. I said, yeah, because the world is racist. I’m sorry we don’t like it. We should fight against it. But the factor of race in international relations is a factor seldom discuss. So these war, we should see them in perspective. Conflict is an inherent quality of international relations. Doesn’t make them less horrendous, but we should not think of that the end of the world is nigh. And that brings me to another point of perspective. The world order that seems to be threatened now was never uncontested.
(00:06:32):
When we talk about world order, somehow unconsciously we think of something that commands consensus, but there is no world order that has ever commanded consensus, total consensus or even substantial consensus, what we now call or some countries called the liberal international order, which by the way wasn’t so liberal to those who were not in agreement with it or it’s fundamental tenets was never uncontested. There was this small unpleasantness called the Cold War, and that was a contest over one conception of international order and we lived with it. It was often very dangerous. It was very messy, but that was the only order we knew for 40 years or more. It was only a very short, historically exceptional period of about 20 years from the time the Berlin Wall came down to maybe the time the global financial crisis broke out, where one conception of international order seemed unchallenged, but it wasn’t really unchallenged. I mentioned the Balkan war. That was a challenge.
(00:07:46):
I mentioned the war in Africa. There was a genocidal conflict in Rwanda, which nobody talked about, and more than that, very fundamental premises of that seemingly natural order of things was challenged by Islamic jihadists in the form of Al Qaeda and other such things who challenged not just the premises of their order, but the premises of modernity, culminating in 9/11, the terrorist attacks right now, that short period about 20 years or so was extremely beneficial to most countries in the world, including Singapore, including China, including I think I would guess most of the countries from which you come, right? But just because it is beneficial does not mean it is any less exceptional or that it can be replicated. It can’t be replicated. What we are seeing today is a return to normalcy. The problem is many of the policymakers or the commentators today grew up, professionally at least, during the exceptional period, and they got very comfortable with their exceptional period and mistaked that exception for the norm.
(00:09:06):
And so they are still somewhat discombobulated and yet to find their bearings. But I say this idea of return to the norm, not as a counsel of despair, actually is a counsel of optimism and hope because all our countries, certainly mine, you see all this out there, all this was developed during that period of contestation. At least the foundations of it was laid and all the countries that developed rapidly developed within that contestation, the companies that flourish and grew large also grew up doing that contestation. So what we have done before we can do again, so we should not despair. In fact, I remind people of this perspective as a message of optimism and hope not of despair. Now, my second point, a broad point is we often are horrified by the humanitarian consequences of what I said is a normal state of affairs, which is war, right?
(00:10:08):
And you can see it. You can see it in Ukraine, you can see it, well, you see it, but you don’t want to see it in most of Africa and you can see it of course in the Middle East, and I’ll use the Middle East as my second example. There’s no doubt the war in Gaza is horrific, as horrific as the attack on Israel on 7 October that sparked it off, right? But let me tell you, there’s something about this and the war within Iran and Israel is also horrific, but all those wars and one resulted from the other, the Iran Israel War is a consequence of Israel’s war against Hamas is one process and it’s not over yet. By the way, this ceasefire is fragile and it’s going to be a ceasefire with Middle Eastern characteristics. In other words, both sides are going to cheat and in fact, I think the possibility of this war conflict breaking out is not higher because the initial damage assessment to Iran’s nuclear program as reported by New York Times and Wall Street Journal and Washington Post this morning was, is not as great as people had expected or hoped.
(00:11:22):
I don’t think it’ll take some time more before we really have a more accurate damage assessment. But OK, it’s not as great as we people hope. That means once, if there are any surviving centrifuges and people say there may be a few. So even and when the stockpile is located, the war will start again – maybe with America or maybe without America, but certainly with Israel, with the support by the way of the Arab countries, the Sunni Arab countries who are totally hypocritical about this thing. OK? Now anyway, but that’s not my main point. What makes this war horrific as it may be, whether over Gaza or between Iran, different from every other Middle Eastern war with a possible exception of the war in 1948 when Israel was formed. I tell you what makes it a different, every other war, the concern of the world was that it would spark a wider global configuration because now that possibility is zero.
(00:12:35):
Why? Because which are the external powers that are going to get involved? The only one that is going to make a difference is the United States. China Middle Eastern strategic policy, the economic actor is largely performative, and Russia has got its hands full in Ukraine. So as horrific as this will be, and I repeat, it’s not going to be the end of the story, this is going to remain a regional conflict. It may spread within the region a little bit if the Iranians are foolish enough to try to block the straits of Hormuz, and I think it would be a deep mistake for them, but they have made a series of mistakes since 7 October with the results we now see.
(00:13:29):
So I can’t rule it out, but even if that happens, it’s a regional conflict and what it will mean is the destruction of the Iranian navy, what’s left of it. So it’s going to be a regional conflict, and I think in other words, it’s geopolitical significance regardless of the humanitarian horror of the, any war is going to be limited. And yet I saw every damn article I read for the last two years since the war in Gaza started was always in a slightly hysterical note of this becoming a wider war. There will be attack on Iran was inevitable, but that’s still the regional war again, I saw there was always a note that this is going to reorder the Middle East. Is it really reorder the Middle East to some degree because Iran has been exposed as completely ineffectual in defending its own borders, its instruments.
(00:14:31):
Hezbollah and Hamas have been destroyed as coherent military forces, but is that a fundamental reordering of the Middle East? I don’t think so. Maybe I’m wrong, but we can discuss it and in all this kind of semi hysteria, the most important story of the Middle East is missed or it is not completely missed, but it’s been crowded out. What’s that important story? That important story is the efforts of Saudi Arabia and some other gas states, but Saudi Arabia is the most important one, to remake their economies, which necessarily entails remaking their societies, which necessarily entails a reconceptualization of their religion, the place of their religion in society that is happening as we speak and that is in the long run, whether they succeed or they fail, I think of greater consequences to the Middle East and the larger umrah, the Muslim world, than this was.
(00:15:33):
So my point, again, I repeat is we have to see things in perspective and we have to see things in order to report on events, whether as a journalist, as a public official, as a academic, we have to see things in perspective. Otherwise we either exaggerate or usually exaggerate. I’ve been doing a lot of – ever since the Ukraine war, one of the joys of being retired is you only could do what you feel like doing. You don’t have to do in any job. Most 90% of your job is things that you must do whether you like it or not. And one of the things I do is give talks to not just talks to people like you but to financial institutions and I always begin by telling them, I’m really amazed that people who make decisions concerning hundreds and millions of dollars, if not billions, have decided willfully until it was not possible to do it, to ignore the geopolitical factors in the world. Yet they have always been there and because there’s always been there and because of the reason they overreact, they usually overshoot one way and then they overcorrect and the market’s gyrate. My last point actually is a market point which has to do with the Middle East. Sorry, this is my second last point.
(00:17:13):
How much has the oil price moved in the last two years? That means spikes, but it is remained pretty constant in the brand crude, at least in the mid 75, 76 US dollar range. And that’s to me quite remarkable. It says quite a lot about the energy market and it says quite a lot of what the markets think about the geopolitical impact of this conflict. Now my real final point is one of the biggest stories that was reported at the time, but people have lost interest in it because they think it’s no longer a story, but I think differently, is the end of the Cold War.
(00:17:56):
The Cold War I told you fundamentally was the only order we knew for about 40 years and its ending was a profound consequence and we are still seeing the effects and I think we’ll still see the effects for some time. There’s been a lot of also fairly hysterical reporting, sometimes very justified about the new US administration led for the second time by Mr. Donald Trump. But how do you understand the Trump phenomenon? To me, Mr. Donald Trump is the first truly post Cold War American president. Why do I say that? Because after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US faces no existential threat anywhere in the world. The US – China is a formidable competitor, but they are both part of one single global system, which I do not believe can bifurcate into two separate systems as existed between the US and the Soviet Union. It’s just too complex, and besides the US and China are both essentially the same kinds of economy, they’re both mixed. It’s not no longer a contest between a system based on a market economy basically and its political consequences and a system based on a plan economy. Every economy is now a mixed economy in the degree the different balances between the mixture between the plan and market elements. Although in the West you do not like to talk about planning. So you talk about regulation instead. It’s the same thing to my mind.
(00:19:39):
So they are competing within a single system and that is not, there can be a very fierce competition and we haven’t seen the end of it yet, but it’s not an existential competition. The object is not for one system to replace another and in the West at least too much attention is based to what I consider epiphenomenal thing, the difference between democracy and authoritarianism. There are differences, but there are many versions of democracy and there are many versions of authoritarianism. So that is not the core issue. There is going to be continued strategic competition between the US and China, but this is not a new Cold War because the Cold War was a systemic competition between two systems to see which is the better way of organizing modern industrial society. We know the answer to that now, as I said, all are mixed economies with minor differences between the balance between mixed plan and market elements. Russia is certainly an existential threat to Ukraine and perhaps to some European states, but is it an existential threat to America? I don’t think so. Ditto North Korea, it can be a regional threat, ditto Iran even. So if America faces no existential threat, why should it – to quote JFK at the height of the Cold War, which was an existential struggle – why should America bear any burden, pay any price, fight any foe to uphold its idea of world order? In other words, it’s time to put America first.
(00:21:28):
Actually every damn country in the world puts itself first. America is not in retreat by putting itself first. It’s just going to be much more discriminating and transactional and narrow in the way it defines its interests and the way it engages the world. And that’s a new reality that I think us in Asia generally accept much better and those in Europe are only beginning to accept. I have been telling Europeans that we have had a Ukraine moment half a century ago when the Americans thought that the war in Vietnam wasn’t worth the candle and therefore said, I have no vital interest in Vietnam and I’m out of here. And I shall now – I’m not out of the region, but I’m not going to get involved in ground wars. I’m going to be the offshore balancer. That’s what happened in Afghanistan a few years ago. It’s still in the region in Middle East. It’s still the most, in fact, the only influential external actor as we can see from the last two years and its behavior since the Gaza War started has been classic offshore balancer behavior and sooner or later it is going to happen in Europe. Sometimes Mr. Trump, in his first campaign, he asks very profound questions. Perhaps it’s an accident that he asks profound questions but they’re nonetheless profound. He asks, why are American troops in Germany? And that’s a very good question, why are American troops in Germany?
(00:23:07):
So I think it is a matter of time that America will move to an offshore balancing role in Europe as it has done in Asia half a century ago as it has done a few years ago in the Middle East and will do in Europe. And the Europeans are completely shocked by this because they have not processed it. Those in Asia and the Middle East, we have always dealt with the Americans on the basis of common interests, not on the illusion of having common values. And that goes for American allies in Asia too and American allies in the Middle East too. Ask any Israeli, he doesn’t believe that they share too many – they share many common values with America, but not totally.
(00:24:01):
So I think we’ll all have to get used to a different America. It’s not an American retreat, but it will be America that is much more transactional. There’s going to be America that’s going to demand more of not just its allies, but its partners and its friends. And this is a new reality that we need to get used to. And I don’t see this being reported. I see too much being reported about Trump’s unique personality. I’m being polite here and OK, he’s not a very likable person. That’s an understatement by the way, but he represents something much larger, a fundamental shift in how America engages the world. And actually he is an extreme version. Every post Cold War president from Clinton with George W. Bush as a slight deception because of 9/11, the main priority has been domestic. For Clinton it was healthcare. OK? It didn’t work out too well.
(00:25:06):
George W. Bush, I told you because of 9/11, right when Obama talked about change, he wasn’t talking about change abroad, he was talking about change in America. At least that’s how I read him. And what’s the big difference between make America great again? That’s Trump and Biden’s Build Back Better, build America back better. What’s the big difference? One is a bit more polite than the other, right? And Mr. Biden was more consultative than Mr. Trump certainly. But don’t forget he’s not consulting you to ask, Hey, how’s your family doing? The kids doing OK and all that. He’s consulting you to see what you’re prepared to do for him to advance American strategic interests. In other words, it’s polite, transactional.
(00:25:59):
Long ago I read American theology and political philosopher by the name of Reinhardt Niebuhr. Reinhardt Niebuhr made a very crucial point. He said that Americans have immense power, but they are very uncomfortable with using their power in pursuit of their national interests and therefore they have always felt it necessary to wrap up their interest in ideas of larger moral significances. And Americans are very good at wrapping. What Mr. Trump has done is rip the wrapping off. Unilateralism, distrust of multilateralism, use of force, threats of use of force, and all the things we don’t like about Mr. Trump are not his inventions. They’ve always been there in American foreign policy until he decided to do reciprocal tariffs. And I don’t think this is a sustainable policy, so it is being modified as we speak. The most disruptive thing any American has ever done was not done by Mr. Trump. It was done in August 1971 by Richard Nixon. When overnight without consulting any of his allies, he destroyed a central pillar of the Bretton Woods system by taking America unilaterally off the gold pact.
(00:27:31):
So the shining city on the hill has always cast a dark shadow. This is not evident to people who live on the hill, but it’s certainly been evident to people that live under the hill, but America is still indispensable to maintain balance. It’s going to be harder to persuade them to do it because they will be more transactional in defining their interest. But how can you have a balance against Russia for Europe without America at least minimally at your back, and therefore Europe will eventually have to do whatever America decides it wants you to do. How can you balance China without America present and therefore America will make demands on its allies, its partners, its friends, and you will have to decide. You don’t have to do everything they ask, but you’ll have to do some things they ask and it’s for every country to decide what they’re bringing to do. Now on that cheerful note, I’ll end and take your questions. Don’t look so glum. I told you I was meant to be optimistic. We survive worse so we can get through this.
Kevin Johnson, NPF (00:28:40):
I have to say that was pretty grim.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:28:43):
It’s a message of cheer and optimism. We’ve gone through worse and we are still here. Yep. Can you tell me who you are please?
Franc Han Shih | Thai Public Broadcasting Service (00:28:55):
Franc from Thai Public Broadcasting.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:28:58):
OK.
Franc Han Shih | Thai Public Broadcasting Service (00:28:59):
Given that you talk about China right now, sorry, United States right now, trying to moving back their maybe troops from Europe, maybe in the Asia, too.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:29:12):
Yeah, from Korea they will.
Franc Han Shih | Thai Public Broadcasting Service (00:29:14):
Yeah. How concern about the region conflicts in Asia no matter is Taiwan, China or South China Sea in that region, conflicts in the Middle East really spark any fire in the region?
Bilahari Kausikan (00:29:25):
No, I don’t think so. I don’t think so. First of all, the Taiwan is completely different from any of the conflicts in the Middle East or the Ukraine. Circumstances are different. Secondly, you look at the Ukraine conflict and you look at the Ukraine conflict, right? There’s a very fundamental factor, international relations that we in Asia don’t think about enough. That’s a nuclear factor. Nuclear weapons are stabilizing. They prevent conflict between countries that have them. India and Pakistan have gone to war twice, but they never escalated the first time. Pakistan took great walloping, but they didn’t escalate the second time. Most recently Europe, India took slightly less walloping, but they didn’t escalate. Trump took credit for it. But actually I know that both Indian Pakistan, the militaries were in constant contact.
(00:30:26):
So nuclear weapons are stabilizing. I don’t believe that China and US will go to war as a matter of design. In other words, as an instrumental policy of the kind that Mr. Putin was trying to do in Ukraine. The risk in our region is of accidents, getting our head, and even there, I think that that risk can be managed. Taiwan is slightly different, but anybody from Taiwan here? Which newspaper? The New York Times Taiwan, that doesn’t count. OK, you are still the New York Times. You’ve got your own problems, but it’s not Taiwan problem. All right? OK. I tell you what, I go to Taiwan pretty often. In fact, I’m going there in a couple of weeks again, and I am increasingly concerned about cross race relations, but I’m concerned on the Taiwan side, first of all, there is a lack of will to defend themselves and there’s a great sense of entitlement that somebody is going to defend me. I don’t know whether you have the same impression.
(00:31:35):
They like to announce this huge, I was just there a couple of months ago and I told some fairly senior people, there’s no point you telling me about your new defense budget, how big it is when it’s stuck in the legislative one. And it’s no more telling me this kind of long jam is characteristic because we are democracy. I say, yeah, you are a democracy. That’s good for you. Well done, but surely faced with this threat, even democracies can have a minimal consensus on this very vital issue of a defense budget. And if you can’t do that, you cannot expect anybody else to believe that you’re already serious about your defense. And I can tell you many other stories why you’re not serious about defense. At the same time, there’s this huge sense of entitlement that because I have chips and so on and I’m so important to the world economy and I’m such a nice democracy, somebody must defend me.
(00:32:31):
This does not compute. That leads to miscalculation on the Taiwanese side, which leads to the action reaction syndrome and that will be harder to control because it’s a much more emotional issue than South China Sea or East China Sea and so on. That is my concern about origin and China. I don’t think China has got huge problems of its own and I actually don’t see their are systemic problems. We can talk about that later if you want. And I actually don’t see there are any solutions to them. There are long-term problems, but they are nonetheless very deep problems.
Kevin Johnson, NPF (00:33:11):
Go ahead.
Ara Eugenio Agence | France-Presse (00:33:14):
Hello, I’m Ara from France-Presse in Manila.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:33:19):
OK.
Ara Eugenio Agence | France-Presse (00:33:20):
So my question is also on this topic of the South China Sea dispute. You mentioned that you’re not really, you don’t think that it’s going to air up and do a wider conflict, especially between the US and China, but I’m just curious what your view is on the recent escalations of conflict, particularly between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea. China’s presence has increased in the dispute waters in recent years, and there have been accidents in the past year concerning Philippines civilian officers there and China’s Coast Guard and maybe the US role in that. We do have a mutual defense treaty with the us. So how is that all going to play out?
Bilahari Kausikan (00:34:04):
OK, nobody is going to make the Chinese give up their claims or dig up those artificial islands that they’re constructed and throw the sandbag the sea. On the other hand, the Chinese cannot stop the US operating in through and over the South China Sea. So there is basically a strategic stalemate and that’s good enough. It’s not ideal, but it’s good enough. In other words, we can move through the South China Sea. Those of us, I come to people like Philippines that have claims, they’re slightly different trading countries like Singapore, Japan, South Korea, we have no claims We can move through the South China, Thailand for that matter too, not by the leaf and favor of any country, but as a matter of, right? Because there is a balance of power. And I think that balance will hold. Now, the claimant states have not had to give up their claims also because of their balance of power. You mentioned Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Have you read it then? You know there’s nothing about mutual defense in it except in the title.
(00:35:13):
I hope your president has read it. Sometimes I wonder, wonder whether he has read it because it’s only about eight or nine articles long. So it’s very easy to read. But it has nothing about mutual defense except in the title it commits the US only to consult if there’s a common threat and perhaps take action in accordance with its constitutional procedures. Meaning it’s a political decision whether to get involved or not. Now, Philippines has been suffering at the hands of China. I know all is happening, but the point is the Philippines has no Navy has no air force worth talking about. That is why the Chinese pick on you and the Americans are not going to help you. The Vietnamese also got claims have been doing quite much more serious things than the Filipino has ever done. They are also reclaiming islands.
They are disputed and the Chinese have done nothing. Why? Because the Vietnamese have a credible military. You need a credible military to hold your own. You can’t defeat China, but you’ll make them more cautious. They’re not cautious with the Philippines because they know you don’t have any capability to respond.
(00:36:30):
And I think the Chinese have correctly assessed that it is at best even odds, probably less than even odds, whether the Americans are going to come to those little specs of dust are very important to the claimant states. They’re not important in the largest strategic picture. So nobody’s going to go to war with them, not for your sake or not for malaysia’s sake or Bruno’s sake or anybody’s sake. So this is the hard reality of the fact you need to build up your capabilities you only recently have begun to do so. You still don’t have much of air force, you still don’t have much of a navy. You need at least that that will create certain caution on the part of China. Vietnam has that. That’s why they’re a bit more cautious in dealing with Vietnam than the Philippines.
Ravi Dutta Mishra | The Indian Express (00:37:28):
This is Ravi from the Indian Express. So I wanted to understand your views. If India can rely on the new US administration for its long-term interests because we have had an anti-China stance for quite some time now, and there has been a conflict with Pakistan. There has been a conflict with China and our relationship with Bangladesh is also suffering because of Chinese influence in that region. So can we really depend on the US to
Bilahari Kausikan (00:38:05):
Firstly, I don’t think your relationship with Bangladesh is suffering only because of Chinese influence. You’re not being very nice to the Bangladeshs yourself, right? In fact, India has a big power, has not been very nice to all its neighbors from time to time. OK, so let’s get this in proportion too. As a small country, I see all big countries with a certain jaundice eye and I like India and I go there often, right? So let’s get a sense of perspective also on this. Secondly, you don’t rely, I don’t think that India relies on the us. You have improved your relationship with the US for strategic reasons, but India generally speaking relies as a long history on relying only on itself and you are not having a bad relationship with China to do you as a favor.
(00:39:03):
You have a strained relationship with China because you have disputes in the Himalayas because there’s an old Chinese saying one mountain can only have one tiger, and you two in a different way need to build up your capabilities and you’re doing it. So I don’t think the US is part, you have improved your relationship with us for a very simple reason, not just China. A much more fundamental reason is for several consecutive Indian governments after Nero, you basically threw your lot in with the Soviet Union, right? You had good reasons for doing it, but there’s no more Soviet in it. So you still maintain a relationship with Russia, but it’s not going to help you in any way. So it’s perfectly logical.
(00:40:04):
Now, I’m often asked this question, is the US reliable? And I also ask, I always answer the same way. I mean of our country, we have a very close defense relationship with the US and I’ve often asked this question and I always answer, of course the US is not reliable, but it’s indispensable. So whether it’s reliable or not is moot. It’s up to me to find a way to work with the us. How can it be reliable when every four years everything is turned upside down, even if the same party is returned to power occupies the White House. But that is the US system. There’s only one us and that one us is indispensable. So we need to find a way to work with it. And so far we have always found a way to work with it. And India will too. You don’t depend on the US to defend usually. I don’t think so. I know you don’t. We don’t depend on the US to defend ourselves. We only depend on the US to a maintain the overall balance of power in the region in its own interest, not as a favor to us. And I think India has a similar attitude and to sell us some weapons that we cannot produce ourselves, mainly advanced fighter aircraft. You have made a different choice. You’re buying referrals, OK, but I don’t think India relies on the US to defend it. I know you don’t.
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:41:34):
Hi, Masum Billah from The Business Standard in Bangladesh. I have two questions.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:41:40):
No wonder you are laughing when I said that.
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:41:47):
We can relate to that.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:41:50):
That’s a different issue I’m sure.
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:41:53):
Anyway, so I have two questions. One, Bangladesh under Professor NUS entering government, they are reaching out to Malaysias and others to become, explore the possibility to be a part of the ASEAN. So do you think
Bilahari Kausikan (00:42:13):
The answer is no
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:42:14):
Ever come possible?
Bilahari Kausikan (00:42:15):
No. We already made one mistake by admitting [indistinguishable]. We don’t want to compound the mistake.
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:42:23):
- OK. I answer. Yes. Yeah. So my second question is about the Rohingya situation. So it’s been going on for years
Bilahari Kausikan (00:42:38):
Decades. Decades.
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:42:40):
The Myanmar situation in 2017 it got only worse.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:42:43):
Yeah
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:42:44):
The Myanmar situation also got even more complicated, especially right across the border of Bangladesh in Rakhine state. So do you think that the ASEAN can take a more active role in the repatriation or overall situation in Myanmar?
Bilahari Kausikan (00:43:04):
What do you expect ASEAN to do? We have neither carrots nor sticks. We can only talk to the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar military, and we stupidly decided not to talk to them with the result entirely predictable that ASEAN is split on this. Thailand has to talk to them because they got long border 2,400 kilometers or more if I’m not mistaken. And you have got maybe a million or more Myanmar in Thailand, legally, illegally, refugees and all those things. ASEAN is split on this issue. They made a fundamental mistake. It was not a wrong thing for us to set certain standards that we expect members to comply with, but those were clearly going to be aspirational because if the Myanmar military was a kind of organization that was willing to talk to his political opponents, not use force against his political opponents, they won’t have pulled a coup in the first place. And we have – there were coups in Thailand, why didn’t we shun them? There may be another coup in Thailand.
(00:44:18):
Well, I don’t know, you maybe know better, but the thing is falling apart. So what are we going to do, shun Thailand? Of course not, right? So we made a very stupid mistake over Myanmar and because I keep telling people we have no carrots, we have no sticks, we can only talk to them. You say you cannot attend my meetings until you do all these things which are impossible, then you can’t even talk to them. And even you talk to them, why should they listen to you when you say, I don’t want to talk to you. So what’s going to happen is in a few months or years, there’ll be some election in Myanmar. It’ll be neither free nor fair, but many ASEAN countries with a great air of relief will say, oh, now you’re OK. Come back.
(00:45:02):
No, there is no solution. Myanmar has been in a state of high intensity or low intensity civil war ever since it’s independent around the borders. This is a little bit worse than the previous, but I do not believe the rebels can overthrow the government, nor can the government completely eradicate the insurgents. So yeah, it’s going to be in this state forever. But you know what’s the most interesting thing about Myanmar? This latest [indistinguishable], nobody cares except the immediate neighbors. All the major powers don’t care because why? It is of no strategic value anymore. I don’t think Myanmar is going to fall totally in the Chinese camp because the Tatmadaw distrust the Chinese deeply. They are also hedged by the biggest weapon supplier now is Russia. So it will be in this mess for the foreseeable future. And more than that, nobody cares about the Rohingya. The Muslim countries in Asia pretend to care, but how many have they taken? They would like them all to go back to Bangladesh. That’s the hard fact. They take a few symbolically because sometimes when you talk about how great Islamic country you are and so on, like [inaudible] is fond of doing, right?
Masum Billah | The Business Standard (00:46:29):
For –
Bilahari Kausikan (00:46:31):
For internal votes or just for bragging rights. Take some right. OK. Everybody would rather they just go back to Bangladesh since the Myanmar don’t want them. OK, sorry. You are in a very bad position. All right, right over here.
Rachel Cheung | The Wire China (00:46:52):
Hi, I am Rachel from the Wire China.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:46:55):
For which one? Wire? Rachel, the
Rachel Cheung | The Wire China (00:46:56):
Wire. China I’m
Bilahari Kausikan (00:46:57):
From. OK. No, I subscribe to the wire.
Rachel Cheung | The Wire China (00:47:02):
Thank you. Thank you. I do want to ask, where do you think the China US strategic rivalry is going to go and where does that leave countries in the region? Do they increasingly have to take a side?
Bilahari Kausikan (00:47:13):
That’s two different questions. OK, first of all, as I said, strategic rivalry between major powers is normal. Sometimes it’s going to be high intensity, sometimes it’s going to be low intensity. I think war by design can be avoided because of nuclear deterrent and I think even accidents can be contained, but it’s going to go on. It’s a new structural reality of international relations. The reason – why did US and China come to some accommodation in 1972? They came to some accommodation because they had a common enemy: the Soviet Union. No Soviet Union, well, the natural dynamics of human nature and international relations reasserted themselves. So I think this is a long-term issue. It’s not – there may be a deal between China and in the US on trade. I don’t think the tariff policy is sustainable. But Americans in this room, you’re all very lucky, any American in this room. I know there are some, I’m not talking about you.
Soo-Hyang Choi | Bloomberg (00:48:25):
You pointing at me?
Bilahari Kausikan (00:48:28):
I’m pointing at him. Americans, I tell my American friends, you’re very lucky because you have a president with no sense of shame, because whatever happens he will say, this is what I wanted in the first place. It is a great victory. So that’s good and we should encourage him. All right, there are two nightmare scenarios for countries in the world actually, and particularly in Southeast Asia and in East Asia. One is of course that the US and China go to war, then you have no room to maneuver. The other, of course, if they come to complete agreement. Once upon a time we were worried about G2, remember that? I don’t think that’s very likely or the other. So some level of tension creates maneuver space. Possibly right now there’s too much tension. So it is going to be harder to maneuver. But I don’t think it’s impossible. When we say we don’t want to choose, we say too often probably, we don’t really explain what we mean by it. So let me try to explain and I think this is a general Southeast Asian attitude and probably general East Asian attitude. But I’ll explain with regard to Singapore.
(00:49:49):
We don’t mean we want to be neutral. It’s impossible. How can you be neutral, right? Because neutrality is not something you can unilaterally declare. It has to be respected by other sites. And while the US and China both say that they don’t want to make people choose, nobody believes them. We don’t mean either. Excuse me, bless you. It’s not contagious. Don’t worry. I have allergy. We don’t mean either that we want to be equidistant because what the hell does that mean anyway? And we can’t be neutral with regard to our own interests. So what we mean is that we will follow our interests in whichever direction they take us and we don’t need to align our interests across all domains in one direction or the other. For example, with Singapore, unless you have been living under a rock as far as defense and security is concerned, you should know. Everybody should know. We have chosen and chosen very long time ago and we’re not very likely to change our choice. That does not mean we cannot have a kind of relationship with the PLA, for example, the SCF has. But it’s a very minor relationship. It’s performative because we don’t want to reveal our doctrine nor do we want to reveal, expose the weapons that the US is kind enough to allow us to buy from them to the PLA because then we will not be able to get those weapons in the future.
(00:51:23):
But in the domain of defense and security, we are basically chosen not just U.S. but West generally. On the other hand, in certain political attitudes. For example, this idea that some ideas are allegedly acclaimed to be universal and that gives some other countries a voice in how we order our internal affairs, our general attitudes are much closer to those of China and indeed of Russia. But in the case of say, economics, then we are completely promiscuous. We’ll go in any damn direction where it is in our advantage and law and prudence permitting. You have to balance off, of course, if you go and start helping China assess very high end semiconductors, sooner or later you’re not going to get the F-35. So we’ll have to create those balances, but it’s not impossible to create those balances. That is how most of Southeast Asia has lived for most of history because we have always lived between major powers and here we are.
(00:52:33):
All this was created. This is all unnatural. It should not exist. All this was created when the Cold War between the US and Soviet was hot in Southeast Asia. And when every southeast Asian country that originally formed ASEAN, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, all of us faced China supported communist insurgencies. Right? Here we are. So it’s not impossible. We just have to keep calm, maintain a sense of perspective and maintain the ability to assess your interest in a cold-blooded way. My first foreign minister when I was a very young officer was very fond of saying ‘every country has two foreign policies, a foreign policy of words and a foreign policy of deeds. And you should never confuse the foreign policy or words for the foreign policy of deeds. If you do that, it’s suicidal’ and that means being rather cold-blooded. And that’s why I started with this ideas about perspective and what is of geopolitical significance is not the same as what of humanitarian disaster. That is sentimental and magical thinking. You need clinical thinking to navigate this much more complex environment. Unfortunately, it’s in rather short supply these days around the world.
Kevin Johnson, NPF (00:53:57):
Christian, go ahead.
Christian Davies | Financial Times (00:53:59):
Hello, Christian Davies from the Financial Times based in Seoul in South Korea. Thank you so much. That was a brilliant presentation and I agree with really all of your analysis, but I’m interested in your cold bloodedness and lack of sentimentalism. We had a American speaker earlier in the program who was talking about US China issues and at one point he said that American public opinion turned against China whenever it was 10 years ago purely because of what China had done. It was all Chinese behavior. And
Bilahari Kausikan (00:54:39):
You ask the Chinese, they will say it is all American.
Christian Davies | Financial Times (00:54:41):
Right? And my reaction of course is thinking that isn’t right, and it reminds you of the kind of lack of self-awareness and you think about whatever, Vietnam, Iraq, all the different things that America has done over time and so on. And so your analysis is a very good corrective to that. And so in that moment I would’ve very much lent towards not just your intellectual analysis, but I think some of the underlying attitude behind it and some of the historical context behind it,
Bilahari Kausikan (00:55:23):
The underlying attitude behind it, why we think this way or I think this way.
Christian Davies | Financial Times (00:55:30):
You’ve obviously – you don’t get to the position you did in the Singapore foreign service without being extremely astute analyst and smart and so on.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:55:39):
You could be lucky too
Christian Davies | Financial Times (00:55:41):
Or lucky too. But as you said, you need to be a bit more clinical, more less sentimental and so on. And so the American sentimentalism can be grating is the point I’m making. I agree with you, but on the other hand, I’m based in Korea and I used to be based in Eastern Europe
(00:56:03):
And in Korea obviously the division was cold power, power politics. But there is a difference between South Korea and North Korea. And there was a difference between East Germany and West Germany. And it was interesting, something you said about the lack of competition, so on, despite all of the Western hypocrisy, which I am aware of and occasionally have partaken in myself, it does feel that a country, a world in which the more power Russia and China have means more people in whatever continent, not just in the West, but in Asia, to living in countries that potentially look more like an East Germany or a North Korea than like a West Germany or a South Korea. And how do you avoid tipping too far into being too clinical and not recognizing that values do exist.
Bilahari Kausikan (00:57:11):
They are important.
(00:57:12):
No values. There is this rather silly debate among international relations theorists about values versus interest. And I think it’s very silly because values are an interest and it is something you can be clinical about too. But I think values, the idea that certain values are universal, that’s a silly idea because the expression of values may be expressed in universal terms, but the implementation of those values, they will vary from country to country according to the circumstances. I think your concern, I understand it, but I think it’s a bit overblown. I can’t believe any country in its right mind wanting to emulate the former GDR East Germany or North Korea as it is today, as a model of how it wants to develop, right?
Christian Davies | Financial Times (00:58:12):
They are extreme manifestations of
Bilahari Kausikan (00:58:14):
Yeah, but you see, but I said I think in passing in the beginning don’t – OK, I’ll put it a different way. There are many variants of democracy. There are many variants of authoritarianism and there are many combinations of these two broad concepts. They’re both very protean terms. Now there’s fashionable to talk about a new axis between us, no, sorry, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea. And yeah, they do have something in common because they all dislike a Western dominated world order. But there are also very significant differences between them. The more significant of them being how much integrated they are into the world economy economic system. And obviously China is the most integrated. Russia is probably the second most integrated and North Korea is probably the least integrated. And that really is quite important distinction because it conditions how they themselves define their interest and how far they are prepared to go.
(00:59:33):
And one of the things about the Iran Israel war, it shows that Russia and China are not prepared to go too far for their own interests. They’re given a lot of rhetorical support to Iran, but not very much of any other kind of support. And I think the Iranians must, I don’t think the Iranians are quite cynical people. I don’t think they would’ve expected anything quite different. So I think this distinction between values are important, but they are important as one kind of interest. But that’s not the only interest, I don’t think if you go and poll people in Singapore, I don’t think you’re going to find any people that would like to go and – they may admire China for this reason or that reason – I don’t think there’re many people want to go and live there. But some people do know their own interests. They’ll probably live rather here than in China. They might be going, working there, making some money and coming back, but they don’t want to go and live there.
(01:00:38):
I have been to North Korea several times. I find it a very interesting place. But find it a very interesting place because I know I can live, and I used to be ambassador in Russia at a very unusual time of Russia history. I haven’t been for quite some time because I don’t want to lose my global entry into the United States. But I also found it very interesting because I knew I could leave. OK, so I think I understand where you’re coming from, but I think you exaggerate a little bit because people know their own interests. Among their interests is their values, but their values, their values are not, there are no unified, you can define your values in universal terms, but when you start implementing them, there will be. But national particularities arising from history, from culture, from economic development and so on and so forth.
(01:01:42):
And look at Korea, South Korea, I mean South Korea in the 1980s was after the late eighties was a military dictatorship. But that military dictatorship laid the foundation of South Korean growth. I think South Korea was very behind North Korea until the 1980s actually now. But as the economy grew and grew more complex, you could not rule South Korea in the same way. Even Dito for Singapore, dito for Taiwan. As your economy gets more complex, you need to not change from one system to the other, but redefine the mixture of different elements in your political system. And China is facing that dilemma. I think they’re reaching some kind of inflection point which they have themselves emitted.
Christian Davies | Financial Times (01:02:36):
Can I just ask though that you may tell me I’m wrong, but I feel like if someone was talking to you in 1980s about South Korea and someone, let’s say an American was saying, well, South Korea should really, and I know the Americans officially weren’t saying this, but they all South Korea should transition to democracy. You might say, oh, that’s an unreasonable expectation. Every country has a different model.
Bilahari Kausikan (01:03:00):
It was –
Christian Davies | Financial Times (01:03:01):
Unreasonable then. But they did make the transition.
Bilahari Kausikan (01:03:03):
They made the transition because it was not sustainable as their economy developed to have the same thing. But South Korea is a democracy, but it’s a very different kind of democracy. South Korea is a democracy, but it’s not a liberal democracy because it’s a very illiberal social structure as you know. You live there, right? In fact, I have told my Japanese friends, it’s a slightly less extreme version of that. One of the greatest cons that Japanese ever pulled after the second World War is a convinced Americans, they are liberal democracy, they are democracy, no doubt they’re not liberal. Their social structure is not quite as extreme as Korea, but in the same framework. And that’s not a liberal structure at all. And I don’t think it will get very much more liberal. So I think it is a matter of time. The problem I have with Americans, they were nagging, they began nagging South Korea quite early because they have this touching belief that there’s one trajectory, they’re very teleological people. They believe there’s one trajectory for development and that is necessary and that it must be similar if not identical for everybody. And that’s to me, complete nonsense.
Kevin Johnson, NPF (01:04:19):
Go ahead.
Soo-Hyang Choi | Bloomberg (01:04:20):
Thank you Han from Bloomberg, I’m also from Korea. Do you think China and Russia would not engage as state sideline for the Middle East situation? If there was a contingency on the current pen? The situation is put different geographically and
Bilahari Kausikan (01:04:37):
Say again,
Soo-Hyang Choi | Bloomberg (01:04:38):
Like China, Russia
Bilahari Kausikan (01:04:39):
Would
Soo-Hyang Choi | Bloomberg (01:04:40):
Not engage as it did not
Bilahari Kausikan (01:04:42):
If on the current peninsula? Yeah,
Soo-Hyang Choi | Bloomberg (01:04:43):
If the simulation happened, OK,
Bilahari Kausikan (01:04:44):
If there’s a contingency on the current peninsula, I think Russia, China, it will be in a completely different position because it’s contiguous to Korea, Russia too. But Russia has less capability. China has capability. But what would it do if there is, OK, I always start from this premise. I think the US has given up this ridiculous idea that China has huge influence over North Korea. North Korea actually has equal influence over China. Bear me, I’ll explain to you. There are only five Leninist systems left in the world. North Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba. Cuba is far away. Four in Asia. The Americans used to have this touching belief that because the Chinese hated the North Korean nuclear program, which they do, they dislike it immensely. They will aid the West in trying to get North Korea to stop their nuclear program. I always thought this was an illusion because the North Korean, the nuclear program is an existential condition for regime survival.
(01:05:54):
And the Chinese know this, they don’t like it, they hate it. I’ve heard them talk about North Koreans and I’ve heard North Korean talk about Chinese and they talk about each other in worse terms than they talk about America. And I asked once North Korean, I’ll tell you a story later, but it’s just, let me answer your question. They know they cannot tolerate regime change in North Korea because that may give their own people inconvenient ideas. So they will never do anything however much North Korea irritate them. So North Korea has leverage over China because North Korea can only threaten to die and China will save them. There’s no choice. And the North Koreans know this and they play pretty well, I must admit they’re very bad people, but they’re very clever people. They’re not mad. They’re bad but not mad. I kind of make that distinction.
(01:06:48):
And they really distrust the Chinese and the Chinese really despise them. Once upon a time before the sanctions took in a lot of North Korean leaders thought of the top one came to Singapore for medical treatment. The person who was most knowledgeable about our healthcare system was the North Korean ambassador here, because his life literally depended on it. If you wanted to know which is the best specialist for which disease, go and ask the North Korean ambassador. He will tell you very precisely because I told you I think his life depended on it, right? So once when I was visiting Pyongyang, I asked my counterpart, why don’t you send your top leaders to China? I mean most of the Chinese healthcare system is nonsense, but at the top levels, and I’m sure you can get access to that, they’re pretty good.
And he said, no, no, no, we don’t trust them. So I got a little worried. I said, our healthcare system is pretty good, but people do die in Singapore too. They say, no, no, no. If they die in Singapore, we know it’s natural.
(01:07:54):
Imagine that. So I don’t think if there is a contingency of the Korea Peninsula, at least China will try to do something. Russia. Russia will talk about it. But I don’t think they have the capability anymore to do very much. Right. But I don’t think, by the way, my Korean friends hate me for saying this. I don’t think either North Korea now South Korea really is interested in reunification. It’ll be a disaster for both of you. For North Korea, it means regime change. For South Korea, no, lemme see, there are how many North Koreans there are 24 million or something like that. And you have had over the years, something like less than a 100,000 North Korean defectors, 60 or 70,000 if I remember correctly. And those 60 or 70,000 are not yet fully integrated into South Korea, can you imagine 24 million integration? They’ll change you more than you will change them.
(01:08:59):
Right? And I don’t think any right thinking South Korean really wants it. I mean, neither of you will give it up as a goal. They did give it up. No, but they didn’t. They said peaceful. I figured actually, I saw that as a very healthy sign. You know why? And he destroyed the reunification. I thought that as a healthy sign because I saw him trying to step out of the shadow of his grandfather and father. Right? I tell you another story long ago. I went there and they asked us for some help on economic reform. And I concluded that they are very smart people. They know exactly what to do, but they didn’t know how to do it without risking the whole system. But there was one small thing that they asked Nampo Port, it’s a river port Nampo port.
(01:09:50):
So we went there and I went there with, what do I know of ports. I brought somebody from our port and we looked at it and we said this, and they told me in private it is very easy to upgrade this port because you give it a coat of paint and the value – it is very primitive, so it is quite possible. But the problem is, and we told them it’s a river port. The river is quite deep. It can take quite big vessels, but there is a dam downstream, and the dam has two locks, which limit the, the tonnage of the ships that can go through. So you have to rebuild this dam, if not demolish it. And they say it’s not possible because this dam was personally supervised, designed and supervised by Kim Jong Il. Now, that was the attitude. This was maybe 2006, 2007. This guy’s father was still, so now if he’s willing to destroy the unification, I think that actually is a pretty positive sign.
(01:10:54):
But I don’t know. And there has been quite a lot of improvement in physical infrastructure in North Korea. It’s still very poor country. The first time I went there in Pyongyang, the showcase city, many buildings had no glass in the windows. They put plastic sheets. I went there in spring, and spring in North Korea is bloody cold. OK? Right. So now I have not seen, I mean, I haven’t been there for some time again because I want to go to the US with no problems. But the last time I went is 2013 or thereabouts. And everybody had glass, they had some new buildings quite well designed. It’s all showcased, but even in the early part, even in the showcase, buildings without glass. So there has been a very incremental progress because don’t forget this young man’s, Kim Jong Un’s policy it’s not military first, but military and economic development.
(01:11:52):
And he pretended to cry a few years ago, remember? And said, I haven’t done enough. OK, crocodile tears. But anyways, it’s kind of very rare for any North Korean leader to admit that he has not done something. So I am not totally pessimistic. I don’t think this is a regime about to collapse before which every South Korean should be profoundly grateful and Chinese are too. So I think the contingency is not going to be this guy invading because he knows that will have only one outcome and it will be not a good one for him. And his main consideration is regime survival. But if there is something happen, if there is a kind of collapse or something, the Chinese will intervene because they will intervene to prop up some form of the regime. They cannot afford to have one or four Asian Leninist systems completely collapsed.
Kevin Johnson, NPF (01:12:50):
Well, I’ve broken my promise to keep this to an hour, but we do have one more question.
Bilahari Kausikan (01:12:54):
- The last one?
Katia Dmitrieva | Bloomberg News (01:13:01):
Testing Katia from Bloomberg News. So we talked about the bipolar world order during the Cold War unipolarity with the US. Really curious about your thoughts of whether you see going forward more of a multipolar world emerging, especially with, well, a lot of signs of it, but Germany investing more military, US, as you said, kind of pulling back from its role.
Bilahari Kausikan (01:13:41):
I think it’s already a multipolar world, but I think we have to reconceptualize what we mean by multipolarity. It is not a symmetrical multipolar world, but it is already a multipolar world. I don’t take the German defense spending seriously yet. Can they sustain it? Let’s see. All right. I doubt they can sustain it because Europe has lost the will to power in my mind, except for one or two countries. But France, maybe UK, somewhere out there, there’s an aircraft carrier. But it is already a multipolar world. But we have to redefine multipolarity. The traditional indeces is population, GDP, military. I think that’s still important. But the international agenda has so much expanded that you have to think of the overall multipolarity, which is an asymmetrical one. And you have to think of multipolarity in various domains. For example, if you think of logistics, Singapore is a pole in that domain. But it is ridiculous to think of us as a pole overall. If you think of – you have to break down multipolarity into, in my concept, into different tiers.
(01:15:11):
In regionally, in domains, and globally, globally is already a multipolar world, but an asymmetrical one, the poles are who there’s more room for middle powers like Japan, South Korea, even Australia. Europe, if it can get its act together, which I’m deeply skeptical, it can; India in some domains, maybe Brazil in some domains, even a tiny country, city-state like Singapore. But only in that domain, if we go mad and turn and try to be a pole outside, we’ll be slapped down pretty quickly. But we can. So you have to think of a much more complex idea or multipolarity, but it’s already a multipolar world.
(01:16:03):
So you have in your mind a very traditional concept of multipolarity when you talk about the bipolar Cold War. Then a unipolar moment. And also, but I think it’s going to be a much more messy world, much more messy ideal order. Not something commanding a consensus, but order defined by the contention between different conceptions of order. And that’s already happening and that’s going to go on for the foreseeable future. I don’t see this period, I said return to normalcy. I don’t see this thing sorting itself out in as neat a denouement as the US Soviet thing. It’s not going to have a clear cut ending one way or the other. Although I believe that China has some very long-term structural issues to which it has no solution, but it will still be there as a pole of some sort.
Kevin Johnson, NPF (01:17:08):
Well, this has been a fascinating journey around the world and a wonderful way to cap these four days. So join me in thanking Bilahari for all of his time. Thank you for not throwing anything.
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